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Abstract
Objective—To determine the source and identify control measures of an outbreak of 
Tsukamurella species bloodstream infections at an outpatient oncology facility.
Design—Epidemiologic investigation of the outbreak with a case control study.
Methods—A case was an infection in which Tsukamurella spp. was isolated from a blood or 
catheter tip culture during January 2011–June 2012 from a patient of the oncology clinic. 
Laboratory records of area hospitals and patient charts were reviewed. A case-control study was 
conducted among clinic patients to identify risk factors for Tsukamurella spp. bloodstream 
infection. Clinic staff were interviewed and infection control practices were assessed.
Results—Fifteen cases of Tsukamurella (T. pulmonis or T. tyrosinosolvens) bloodstream 
infection were identified, all in patients with underlying malignancy and indwelling central lines. 
Median age of case-patients was 68 years; 47% were male. The only significant risk factor for 
infection was receipt of saline flush from the clinic during September–October 2011 (P=0.03), 
when the clinic had been preparing saline flush from a common-source bag of saline. Other 
infection control deficiencies that were identified at the clinic included suboptimal procedures for 
central line access and preparation of chemotherapy.
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Conclusion—Although multiple infection control lapses were identified, the outbreak was likely 
caused by improper preparation of saline flush syringes by the clinic. The outbreak demonstrates 
that bloodstream infections among oncology patients can result from improper infection control 
practices and highlights the critical need for increased attention to and oversight of infection 
control in outpatient oncology settings.
Introduction
Over 600,000 oncology patients receive outpatient chemotherapy in the United States 
annually and are at increased risk for bloodstream infections because of the use of 
immunosuppressive chemotherapy and long-term invasive lines.1–3 Tsukamurella spp. are 
gram-positive bacilli that have been isolated in the environment from soil and sludge and are 
uncommonly reported to cause human disease4. The organism is frequently misidentified as 
other bacteria, such as Nocardia spp. or Rhodococcus spp.4–7 Bloodstream infections, the 
most common presentation of Tsukamurella spp. infections, primarily occur in patients with 
indwelling central lines and/or immunosuppression.4–6,8
In October 2011, microbiology staff at an acute care hospital in West Virginia (Hospital A) 
noticed that the proportion of blood cultures growing potential contaminants (e.g., gram-
positive bacilli) had recently increased. The most recent isolates, which had been identified 
as Bacillus spp., all came from patients of the same oncology clinic (Clinic A). This cluster 
was reported to the West Virginia Bureau of Public Health (WVBPH), which performed an 
on-site investigation at Clinic A. Identified lapses in infection control practices were 
addressed.
Isolates from the cluster were subsequently determined by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) to be Tsukamurella spp. Because additional cases continued to be 
reported, WVBPH and the oncology clinic requested that CDC conduct an additional on-site 
investigation in June 2012.
We describe findings from the investigation of the first reported outbreak of Tsukamurella 
spp. infections.
Methods
Case definition and case finding
A case was defined as an infection in a patient of Clinic A during January 2011–June 2012 
in which Tsukamurella spp. was isolated from a blood or catheter tip culture. Since clinical 
cultures from Clinic A’s patients were processed by hospital laboratories, case finding was 
performed by reviewing microbiology laboratory results from Hospital A and other area 
hospitals during January 2011–June 2012. Because of the concern for potential 
misidentification, all gram-positive bacillus isolates from blood and catheter tip cultures 
were identified from Hospital A’s microbiology records. If not already identified as 
Tsukamurella spp., morphologies from gram stains were reviewed to determine whether they 
were consistent with Tsukamurella spp. From other area hospitals, microbiology laboratory 
staff were asked to report Tsukamurella spp. isolates from blood or catheter tip cultures. If 
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they lacked the capability to identify Tsukamurella spp., they were asked to report clusters 
of Bacillus spp. from blood or catheter tip cultures.
Case-control study
An unmatched case-control study was conducted to determine risk factors for Tsukamurella 
spp. bloodstream infection. All identified cases were included. Controls were selected from 
among patients seen at Clinic A during September 2011–May 2012 who had a central line 
for at least 7 days during this time period, and in whom Tsukamurella spp. had not been 
isolated from any clinical specimen. Two controls were selected per case. For both cases and 
controls, a standardized data abstraction form was completed after reviewing Clinic A and 
Hospital A records to collect information regarding demographics, underlying medical 
conditions, hospital course (if applicable), and prior healthcare exposures.
Statistical analyses were performed using SAS, version 9.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC). 
Categorical variables were analyzed using χ2 statistics or Fisher’s exact test as appropriate. 
Continuous variables were compared using a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test. P values less than 
0.05 were considered statistically significant.
Assessments of infection control and medication preparation practices
WVBPH and CDC teams interviewed Clinic A staff and observed infection control 
procedures related to parenteral medication storage and handling, including chemotherapy 
preparation, and use of central lines, including drawing blood, flushing lines, and changing 
dressings.
Microbiologic investigation
Environmental samples were obtained from Clinic A for bacterial culture during site visits. 
In October 2011, these samples included items used to prepare central lines for access. In 
June 2012, additional environmental samples were obtained, including swab samples from 
sink faucets and aerators, samples of water from sinks, and surface samples from patient 
examination rooms and where medications were prepared. Surface specimens were obtained 
using Sponge Sticks (3M, St. Paul, MN). Hand cultures (Handi wipes®, Clorox, Oakland, 
CA) of healthcare workers9 in Clinic A were also obtained during June 2012.
Environmental samples and hand cultures were blended in saline buffer containing 
polysorbate. The resulting homogenates were concentrated by centrifugation and then 
inoculated onto blood agar plates. Cultures were incubated at 37°C on blood agar plates for 
up to a week and screened for colony characteristics consistent with Tsukamurella spp. 
Isolates were identified as Tsukamurella spp. by 16S RNA gene sequencing. To further 
characterize isolates, Random Amplification of Polymorphic DNA Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (RAPD-PCR) was performed using an adaption of methods described previously.10
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Clinic A, an independently owned and operated oncology clinic located inside a hospital 
complex, provides outpatient oncology services including medical evaluations and infusions 
(e.g., chemotherapy). Each day at Clinic A, 20–30 patients receive infusions; most (>50%) 
do not have indwelling central lines. Clinic A does not use a pharmacy or employ a licensed 
pharmacist to assist with the preparation of infusions. Rather, nursing staff prepare 
medications in a dedicated clinic room containing a combination biological safety cabinet/
chemical fume hood for preparing and handling chemotherapy agents. Other medications are 
prepared in an adjacent area within the same room. Clinic A’s patients visit Hospital A for 
services such as hospital admissions, collection of blood cultures, and selected other 
laboratory tests.
Description of cases
Fifteen cases of Tsukamurella spp. infections were identified. Fourteen cases were reported 
from Hospital A’s laboratory. One case was reported from another hospital in the region. 
The majority of cases (9/15 [60%]) occurred during September–October 2011, though some 
cases presented as late as February–May 2012 (Figure 1). The median age of all case-
patients was 68 years, 47% were male, and 93% were of white race. Case-patients had 
received care at Clinic A for a median of 9.5 months (range: 1–102 months). All case-
patients had received a diagnosis of malignancy, and all also had an indwelling central line 
though central line types varied.
Case-patients most commonly presented with fevers or chills (12/14 case-patients [86%] 
with information available); 14/15 (93%) required hospitalization (Table 1). Most (67%) had 
>2 sets of cultures growing Tsukamurella spp. Because most isolates were first reported to 
be Bacillus spp., some treating clinicians initially regarded isolates as contaminants; 
initiation of therapy was delayed for three case-patients. One case-patient died within 30 
days of infection, although whether this death was attributable to Tsukamurella spp. 
infection was unclear.
Review of potential risk factors for infection did not reveal a shared healthcare worker, 
common location within Clinic A where cases were treated, common chemotherapy regimen 
or other treatment given, or single date on which cases visited the clinic. However, all case-
patients had received saline for central line flushes at Clinic A, the only specific healthcare 
exposure common to all cases. Notably, one case-patient’s central line was accessed only 
once by Clinic A staff before the infection, when the line was flushed with saline. Six days 
later, the patient presented to the emergency room with neutropenia, fevers and hypotension; 
blood cultures obtained at this visit grew Tsukamurella spp. In addition, all three case-
patients with late-onset infection (i.e., during February–May 2012) had implanted ports. 
Two of them did not receive any chemotherapy during the outbreak. Their ports were only 
accessed during monthly flushes with saline by Clinic A staff.
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Thirty control patients were included in the case-control study. The only significant risk 
factor for developing Tsukamurella spp. infection was receipt of saline flush from Clinic A 
during September–October 2011 (14/15 cases [93%] vs 9/15 controls [60%], P=0.03) (Table 
2). The single case-patient who did not receive saline flush from Clinic A during September 
2011 had received saline flush in late August 2011 and developed illness a few weeks later. 
Clinical characteristics, such as duration and type of central line, did not differ between 
cases and controls. Other healthcare exposures, such as receipt of chemotherapy and prior 
hospitalization, were also not significant risk factors for Tsukamurella spp. infection.
Assessments of infection control and medication preparation practices
During the October 2011 site visit, WVBPH staff noted that rather than using pre-packaged, 
commercially manufactured saline flush syringes, at the beginning of each day clinic staff 
pre-drew 10 mL saline flush syringes from a new 250 mL bag of normal saline within the 
chemotherapy hood. In the patient care area, clinic staff moistened non-sterile cotton balls 
with alcohol obtained from a common dispensing bottle to perform antisepsis of catheter 
connection caps and medication vials, a technique that could lead to inadequate antisepsis.
During the June 2012 site visit, several lapses in infection control practices were found 
pertaining to the preparation and handling of both chemotherapy and non-chemotherapy 
medications in the medication preparation room. For example, single-dose medication vials 
opened outside of the hood were stored and reused over multiple days. Furthermore, most 
non-chemotherapy medications were prepared next to a sink, which could contaminate 
medications with tap water. Although syringes and needles were discarded after use for 
patients, occasionally staff drew and combined multiple medications using a single syringe 
and needle, which could cross-contaminate medication vials being used for other patients if 
aseptic technique was not strictly followed. In addition, the chemotherapy hood was adjacent 
to a window that was opened intermittently, contrary to the stringent air flow requirements 
specified in guidelines for safely preparing sterile medications (including chemotherapy).11 
When medications were prepared inside the hood, gloves were not regularly disinfected 
during use (e.g., routine application of isopropyl alcohol to gloved hands11) and insects had 
been seen on these gloves, which were stored on the windowsill. Chemotherapy hood 
disinfection protocols were also not followed appropriately (e.g., paper towels, with the 
potential to shed fibers leading to contamination, and isopropyl alcohol of insufficient 
strength [47.5%] were routinely used to clean the hood).11,12
Microbiologic investigation
Of the Tsukamurella spp. isolates available from 13 case-patients, all were either 
Tsukamurella pulmonis or Tsukamurella tyrosinosolvens, although some isolates could not 
be definitively assigned a species. Based on similar banding patterns, RAPD-PCR testing 
suggested that 12 of the 13 isolates might be related (Figure 2). No Tsukamurella spp. 
isolates were recovered from environmental samples.
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On recommendation from WVBPH, after the October 2011 site visit Clinic A stopped 
preparing its own saline flush syringes and began using pre-packaged manufactured saline 
flush. Clinic A staff also stopped using cotton balls for antisepsis, instead using pre-
packaged manufactured sterile 70% isopropyl alcohol pads to disinfect catheter connection 
caps and medication vials. Following the June 2012 site visit, the window in the medication 
preparation room was permanently closed and sealed shut. General injection safety guidance 
was provided, with recommendations to consult a licensed pharmacist for further evaluation 
and remediation of chemotherapy preparation practices. Clinic A was also asked to develop 
an infection control manual, document training of nurses in central line care, document 
observations of nursing technique, and develop a plan for tracking bloodstream infections 
from clinic patients. Clinic A complied with these requests.
Discussion
This is the first reported outbreak and largest described cluster of Tsukamurella spp. 
infections. Affected patients all had underlying malignancies. Most also experienced 
persistent bacteremia requiring hospitalization and central line removal. Although the source 
of the outbreak was not identified through environmental sampling, the epidemiologic 
investigation suggested that infusion of saline flush prepared by Clinic A (prior to the health 
department’s visit in October 2011) was the likely source of the infections. The only shared 
exposure among cases was receipt of saline flush prepared by the clinic; for some cases, this 
was the only medication infused through central lines. In addition, the saline flush prepared 
by Clinic A staff was the only significant risk factor found in the case-control study. Finally, 
after Clinic A stopped preparing its own saline flush, the frequency of cases declined, further 
supporting the saline flush as the source of infection.
In this outbreak, some infections occurred several months after receipt of saline flush 
prepared by Clinic A. This delay between exposure of a parenteral medication and 
development of bloodstream infection is not unprecedented. In a 2004 outbreak of 
Pseudomonas fluorescens bloodstream infections involving contaminated heparin, a number 
of cases occurred several months after their last exposure to the implicated heparin flush.13 
In both the previous outbreak and ours, all late-onset cases had implanted ports. Although 
implanted ports confer a lower risk of bloodstream infections than other types of indwelling 
central lines, ports might uniquely allow for a delayed presentation of bloodstream 
infections. The reservoir of a port, which lies beneath the septum, can develop biofilms as 
well as contaminated debris.14 In the Pseudomonas outbreak, it was postulated that for late-
onset cases, too few organisms were initially present to cause symptoms. Over time the 
reservoir might become colonized via biofilms or contaminated debris, leading to bacteremia 
in later months.13 A similar phenomenon might explain the long delay between receipt of 
saline flush and development of symptomatic infection in some of our cases.
After the June 2012 on-site investigation, one additional patient at Clinic A acquired a 
Tsukamurella spp. bloodstream infection. WVBPH investigated and did not identify 
additional lapses in infection control practices at Clinic A. However, this patient’s history is 
similar to the other late-onset cases: the patient had an implanted port and prior to the start 
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of the Tsukamurella spp. outbreak had only received monthly flushes of the port from Clinic 
A.
Saline bags are not labeled as FDA-approved multiple dose containers. Using a preservative-
free bag of saline to prepare multiple pre-drawn saline flush syringes increases the 
likelihood of contaminating the flush when the practice is not performed under optimal 
conditions. This practice has been implicated in previous outbreaks of bacterial bloodstream 
infections involving outpatient oncology facilities.15,16 When performed outside an 
appropriate environment (e.g., chemotherapy hood), this practice violates the injection safety 
component of Standard Precautions which states that bags of intravenous solution should not 
be a common source of supply for multiple patients.17 In this clinic, although the saline 
flush syringes were prepared in a chemotherapy hood, accepted pharmacy standards for 
working in such a hood were not followed. The lapses in appropriate technique while 
working in the hood likely allowed repeated contamination of the saline during the outbreak 
from the environment (e.g., via the open window). Several other lapses in injection safety 
were also identified (e.g., storage and reuse of opened single dose vials).
These lapses are consistent with those reported in a number of other outpatient-associated 
outbreaks and highlight the challenge of ensuring proper infection control practices in these 
settings.15,16,18–20 As was evident with Clinic A, not all outpatient facilities have dedicated 
infection control policies for patient protection nor consult regularly with individuals with 
training and expertise in infection prevention. Federal and state agencies establish infection 
control requirements for acute care hospitals. In contrast, in many states no corresponding 
oversight exists for independent oncology clinics.
Oncology practices are unique among outpatient settings because of a highly 
immunosuppressed patient population and because of challenges with preparing and 
administering chemotherapy. The West Virginia state pharmacy code allows physicians to 
compound medications for their patients without the involvement of a licensed pharmacist21; 
such laws vary by state. Problems can arise when, as occurred in Clinic A, no staff members 
are knowledgeable in proper medication preparation practices. Strict adherence to published 
standards, such as the United States Pharmacopeia Chapter <797> and American Society of 
Health-System Pharmacists guidelines for handling hazardous drugs,11,12 is essential to 
ensure the safety of chemotherapy given to patients. However, outpatient oncology facilities 
might vary greatly in their awareness and adoption of these standards.
To help outpatient oncology facilities establish appropriate infection control strategies, CDC 
developed a basic infection control plan tailored to these settings outlining key policies and 
procedures needed to meet minimal requirements for patient safety.22 These include the 
proper use and handling of injectable medications and correct procedures for accessing 
central lines. Outpatient oncology facilities without an existing plan are encouraged to use 
this document as a starting point. Facilities with an existing plan should ensure that it 
includes the essential elements outlined in the document. As recommended in the basic 
infection control plan, oncology outpatient facilities should consult with an infection 
preventionist for on-site evaluations and observations of practices. They should also consult 
with a pharmacist for guidance on appropriate preparation and handling of chemotherapy 
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medications. Further work is in progress to characterize the scope of deviations from 
recommended chemotherapy preparation practices among outpatient oncology facilities. 
Understanding the magnitude of the problem will facilitate efforts to increase facility 
awareness of and adherence to applicable standards.
This outbreak also illustrates the need for standardized methodology to perform bloodstream 
infection surveillance in these settings. Although we were unable to determine the clinic’s 
overall rate of bloodstream infections, there currently are no established methods to 
calculate bloodstream infection rates from outpatient settings, nor any standards by which to 
determine if a given rate is elevated.
We acknowledge limitations with the investigation. First, clinical information about patients 
was obtained solely by retrospective chart review, and we were unable to obtain information 
about exposures for the entire cohort of patients in the clinic. Second, in hospitals other than 
Hospital A, the case-finding strategy focused on potential misidentification of the organism 
as Bacillus spp. Since Tsukamurella spp. can be misidentified as other bacteria some cases 
might have been missed.7 Third, infection control and medication preparation practices in 
Clinic A changed over the course of the investigation; therefore some practices that 
contributed to risk of infection might not have been observed. Fourth, environmental testing 
took place several weeks after the last case was identified, limiting our ability to identify 
potential environmental sources.
A combination of careful descriptive epidemiology with particular attention to outlier cases, 
direct observations, and analytic studies were needed to support this investigation, which 
pointed to deficiencies in medication preparation practices as the cause of these unusual 
infections. The following lessons can be learned from this investigation. First, gram-positive 
bacilli bloodstream isolates from patients with indwelling central lines might represent 
unusual organisms, such as Tsukamurella spp. Second, breaches in medication preparation 
and handling in outpatient oncology settings are a potential source of infections, and more 
uniform standards and oversight are needed. Third, vigilance and cooperation between 
laboratory professionals, clinicians, and public health officials are essential for investigations 
of healthcare-associated outbreaks.
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Epidemic curve of Tsukamurella spp. cases by month positive culture collected, Clinic A 
patients, West Virginia, 2011–2012.
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Results of Random Amplification of Polymorphic DNA PCR (RAPD-PCR) of available 
Tsukamurella spp. outbreak isolates, West Virginia, 2011–2012. Positive control represents 
Tsukamurella tyrosinosolvens isolate unrelated to the outbreak.
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Table 1
Clinical characteristics of 15 Clinic A oncology patients with Tsukamurella spp. isolated from blood or 
catheter specimens in West Virginia, 2011–2012.
Characteristic No. (%)
Presenting symptoms (n=14)a
 Fever/Chills 12 (86)
 Hypotension   2 (14)
Malignancy 15 (100)
 Solid organ 13 (87)
 Hematologic   2 (13)
Presence of central line 15 (100)
 Implanted port   8 (53)
 Tunneled catheter   6 (40)
 PICC line   1 (7)
Number of sets of cultures with Tsukamurella spp., median (range) 3b (1–8)
Outcomes
 Hospitalized for infection 14 (93)
 Received antibiotic therapy for infectiona (n=14) 13 (93)
 Required central line removala (n=14) 10 (71)
 Death within 30 days   1 (7)
Note PICC, peripherally-inserted central catheter. Data are No. (%) unless otherwise specified.
a
Clinical information not available for one patient.
b
All positive cultures were either blood cultures or catheter tip cultures.
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Table 2
Comparison of Demographics, Clinical Characteristics, and Healthcare Exposures of Tsukamurella spp. Cases 







 Age, median (range)   67 (56–78)   68 (50–85) 0.99
 Male sex     7 (47)   10 (33) 0.38
 White race   14 (93)   30 (100) 0.33
Clinical characteristic
 Diabetes     3 (20)     3 (10) 0.38
 Neutropenic at diagnosisa     4 (27)     9 (30) 1.00
 Central line duration, median (range) 138 (31–1092) 192 (7–2253) 0.93
 Solid organ malignancy   13 (87)   25 (83) 1.00
 Implanted port     8 (53)   16 (53) 1.00
Healthcare exposure
 Chemotherapy given in clinic within 30 days   11 (73)   22 (73) 1.00
 Saline flush within 30 days prior   13 (87)   23 (77) 0.70
 Saline flush Sep/Oct 2011, prior to culture   14 (93)   18 (60) 0.03
 Hospitalization within 30 days     7 (47)     7 (23) 0.17
Note OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval. Data are No. (%) of patients, unless otherwise indicated.
a
Neutropenia was defined as absolute neutrophil count <500 cells/mm3 on the date of collection of the first positive Tsukamurella spp. culture
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